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AN ESSAY ON FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND ADMIRALTY 
ROBERT FORCE* 
Today we characterize that part of substantive maritime law which is 
derived from judicial decisions rather than legislation as “the general maritime 
law.”1 As was noted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the 
general maritime law is probably the oldest body of federal common law.2 
Underlying the theme of this session is the question, or perhaps, challenge: by 
what authority do federal courts create substantive rules of maritime law? 
Asked differently, why should maritime, or admiralty, law be any different 
from other areas of private law where, in the absence of congressional 
legislation, state law provides the substantive rule of law? 
Several articles written by non-admiralty scholars have appeared in 
respected law reviews, asserting that the bulk of what admiralty lawyers and 
teachers refer to as the general maritime law is unconstitutional.3 Their 
argument, stated in overly simplified terms, is that there is nothing in the 
Constitution that delegates to the federal government the power to legislate 
admiralty and maritime rules, except to the extent that such rules fall within the 
expressly delegated powers of Congress, such as the power to regulate 
interstate and foreign commerce under the commerce clause. In other words, 
Congress may enact maritime legislation only by exercising powers expressly 
delegated to it in Article I of the Constitution. The argument assumes that even 
if Article III, the article of the Constitution which creates the judicial branch, 
permits an inference of legislative authority from the grant of jurisdiction over 
“admiralty or maritime cases,” that delegation of powers is conferred to the 
legislative branch of the government. The power to legislate has been 
purposefully vested in the branch of government directly accountable to the 
people, not in a judiciary whose members are appointed for life. Furthermore, 
 
* Niels F. Johnsen Professor of Maritime Law and Director, Tulane Maritime Law Center. 
The substance of this paper was presented to the Section on Maritime Law of the Association of 
American Law Schools at its meeting in New Orleans in January 1999. 
 1.  THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 3-1 (2d ed. 1994). 
 2.  Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 43 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing In re Air 
Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 828 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 3.  See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1999); 
Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1245, 1341-60 (1996), and authorities cited therein. 
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the enactment of federal legislation inevitably implicates considerations of 
federalism, especially when federal rules preempt state law in order to achieve 
uniformity. The decision to formulate a federal rule displacing a state rule, so 
the argument goes, should be made by the branch of government likely to be 
most sensitive to the interests of the states. This analysis sets the stage for the 
final step of the attack on the general maritime law, that because nothing in the 
Constitution delegates to the federal judiciary the power to make substantive 
rules, i.e., to legislate, the federal judiciary has no power to preempt state law. 
The underlying theory behind this attack is simply that the general maritime 
law, being nothing more than a form of federal common law, should not be an 
exception to the rationale of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.4 The objects of the 
argument are to remove the law-making and preemptive effects of the general 
maritime law and to “re-invest” the authority to establish maritime law in the 
states. 
This contention is not new. It has been debated among the justices of the 
Supreme Court from the nation’s earliest times and has been rejected by the 
Court for at least 150 years. For example, in 1857, competing philosophies 
were expressed in Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia,5 a case in which a 
majority of the Court agreed to the assertion of federal admiralty jurisdiction 
over a collision on the Alabama River. The majority rejected the contention 
that federal admiralty jurisdiction was absent because the waters were not tidal 
waters and the collision occurred within the body of the county, that is, within 
the state. In concluding that the lower federal court could exercise jurisdiction, 
the Court acknowledged that it had abandoned the test of admiralty jurisdiction 
used in England and substituted a “navigable waters” test for admiralty 
jurisdiction. The new test was better suited to the geography of the United 
States which, unlike England, has a great inland river system. 
Justice McClean briefly expressed a pragmatic view in his concurring 
opinion: 
Antiquity has its charms, as it is rarely found in the common walks of 
professional life; but it may be doubted whether wisdom is not more frequently 
found in experience and the gradual progress of human affairs; and this is 
especially the case in all systems of jurisprudence which are matured by the 
progress of human knowledge. Whether it be common, chancery, or admiralty 
law, we should be more instructed by studying its present adaptations to 
human concerns, than to trace it back to its beginnings. Every one is more 
interested and delighted to look upon the majestic and flowing river, than by 
following its current upwards until it becomes lost in its mountain rivulets.6 
 
 4.  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 5.  61 U.S. 296 (1857). 
 6.  Id. at 307. 
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A historical view was expressed in Justice Daniel’s dissenting opinion: 
But the court, after having declared the correctness of the English rule and its 
adoption here, go on to say, nevertheless, ‘that a definition which would at this 
day limit public rivers to tide-water rivers is wholly inadmissible.’ And why? 
Because the Constitution, either by express language or by necessary 
implication, recognizes or looks to any change or enlargement in the principles 
or the extent of admiralty jurisdiction? Oh, no! For no such reason as this. “But 
we have now (say the court) thousands of miles of public navigable water, 
including lakes and rivers, in which there is no tide.” Such is the argument of 
the court, and, correctly interpreted, it amounts to this: The Constitution, which 
at its adoption suited perfectly well the situation of the country, and which then 
was unquestionably of supreme authority, we now adjudge to have become 
unequal to the exigencies of the times; it must therefore be substituted by 
something more efficient; and as the people, and the States, and the Federal 
Legislature, are tardy or delinquent in making this substitution, the duty or the 
credit of this beneficent work must be devolved upon the judiciary. It is said by 
the court, “that there is certainly no reason for admiralty power over a public 
tide-water, which does not apply with equal force to any other public waters 
used for commercial purposes.” Let this proposition be admitted literally, it 
would fall infinitely short of a demonstration, that because the Constitution, 
adequate to every exigency when created, did not comprise predicaments not 
then in existence or in contemplation, it can be stretched, by any application of 
judicial torture, to cover any such exigency, either real or supposed.7 
Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia, and the cases on which it relied, 
involved important issues. To some extent, the enlargement of federal 
jurisdiction came at the expense of the state courts. Where admiralty 
jurisdiction is present, suitors may bypass state courts and bring their actions in 
federal court. Further, in state court, the right to a jury trial is preserved in 
ordinary contract and tort cases. In admiralty, there is no right to a jury trial. 
An expansive view of federal admiralty jurisdiction permits cases which 
otherwise would be tried to a jury in state courts to be tried without a jury in 
federal admiralty courts. The justices who opposed a broad view of federal 
admiralty jurisdiction were deferential to state courts and protective of the right 
to a jury trial. But they also knew that another important issue was stake. 
Underlying the jurisdictional issue lay the question of whether federal judges 
had the power to make rules of admiralty and maritime law that would apply to 
actions arising in inland waters. If admiralty jurisdiction had been restricted to 
events and transactions on the high seas and tidal waters, then all litigation 
which arose out of events and transactions on the many rivers and lakes in the 
United States would have been relegated to state courts (assuming the parties 
 
 7.  Id. at 319 (emphasis added). 
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were not diverse), where disputes would have been resolved under state law.8 
In a series of decisions including The Steamboat Magnolia, the majority of the 
Supreme Court justices who extended admiralty jurisdiction also impliedly 
extended the authority of the Court to formulate general rules of maritime law 
applicable to disputes arising on all navigable waters of the United States, 
including inland waters. With the expansion of admiralty jurisdiction came the 
expansion of federal law, in the sense that rules of the general maritime law 
would apply to a wider range of cases, including those of a more localized 
nature. 
This fact was not lost on the Court. As Justice Campbell dissenting in The 
Steamboat Magnolia bemoaned: 
In the court of admiralty the people have no place as jurors. A single judge, 
deriving his appointment from an independent Government, administers in that 
court a code which a Federal judge has described as ‘resting on the general 
principles of maritime law, and that it is not competent to the States, by any 
local legislation, to enlarge, to limit, or narrow it.’ 
If the principle of this decree is carried to its logical extent, all cases arising in 
the transportation of property or persons from the towns and landing-places of 
the different States, to other towns and landing-places, whether in or out of the 
State; all cases of tort or damage arising in the navigation of the internal 
waters, whether involving the security of persons or title to property, in either; 
all cases of supply to those engaged in the navigation, not to enumerate others, 
will be cognizable in the District Courts of the United States. If the dogma of 
judges in regard to the system of laws to be administered prevails, then this 
whole class of cases may be drawn ad aliud examen, and placed under the 
dominion of a foreign code, whether they arise among citizens or others. The 
States are deprived of the power to mould their own laws in respect of persons 
and things within their limits, and which are appropriately subject to their 
sovereignty. The right of the people to self-government is thus abridged-
abridged to the precise extent, that a judge appointed by another Government 
may impose a law, not sanctioned by the representatives or agents of the 
people, upon the citizens of the State.9 
What has transpired since those days. To put matters into perspective, I 
propose to take a few moments to summarize some of the most important 
sources of United States maritime law. Today, maritime law is a blend of 
congressional legislation (some of which implements international 
 
 8.  Congress itself had previously intervened by conferring “admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction” over the Great Lakes through the Great Lakes Act of 1845. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, 5 
Stat. 726-727, c. 20 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1994)).  See also The Propeller 
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443 (1851). 
 9.  Jackson, 61 U.S. at 341 (citation omitted). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1999] AN ESSAY ON FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND ADMIRALTY 1371 
conventions), the general maritime law, and state law.10 Let us examine 
various areas of maritime law. 
COMMERCIAL LAW 
Congress has enacted at least five statutes that deal with maritime 
commercial law. The Harter Act,11 the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
(“COGSA”)12 and the Pomerene Act13 distinctly apply variously ways to the 
transportation of goods by water. None of these statutes contains a 
comprehensive treatment of the subject matter. In fact, Harter and COGSA 
were designed, more or less, to address specific problems in commercial 
shipping. Where there is a dispute arising out of the carriage of goods and there 
is no rule specified in these statutes, courts create rules of general maritime 
law. Sometimes courts merely interpret or fill gaps, such as in devising a rule 
to deal with application of the COGSA package limitation of liability to cargo 
shipped in containers,14 or in determining the affect of a deviation on the 
availability of COGSA defenses and limitation of liability.15 Sometimes courts 
actually go beyond the bounds of legislation and formulate rules of general 
maritime law, such as rules for determining the validity of Himalaya clauses16 
or the effect to be given to the incorporation of COGSA in contracts not 
otherwise subject to COGSA ex proprio vigore.17 Of course, there are some 
cases not governed by congressional legislation where federal courts have 
applied state law.18 
In the commercial area, where contracts of carriage are not governed by 
bills of lading, such as in voyage charter parties, none of the aforementioned 
legislation applies as a matter of law, although the parties may incorporate all 
or part of COGSA into their contract of carriage. In such cases, particularly 
 
 10.  There are also occasional references to ancient law, custom, English law and the laws of 
other countries. See SCHOENBAUM supra note 1, at § 3-1. 
 11.  Harter Act, ch. 105, 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (current version at 46 U. S.C. app. §§ 190-96 
(1994)). 
 12.  Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (current version at 46 
U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-15 (1994)). 
 13.  Pomerene Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 80101-16 (1994). 
 14.  See, e.g., Monica Textile Corp. v. S.S. Tana, 952 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 15.  See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 536 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), 
aff’d, 706 F.2d 80 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983). 
 16.  See, e.g., Grace Line, Inc. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 500 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 17.  See, e.g., Jamaica Nutrition Holdings, Ltd. v. United Shipping Co., 643 F.2d 376 (5th 
Cir. 1981). 
 18.  See, e.g., Colgate Palmolive v. S/S Dart Canada, 724 F.2d 313, 315, 316 (2d Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963 (1984); All Pacific Trading, Inc. v. Vessel M/V Hanjin Yosu, 7 F.3d 
1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1993); O’Connell Machinery Co.  v. M/V Americana, 797 F.2d 1130, 1137 
(2d Cir. 1986); cf. Wemhoener Pressen v. Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc., 5 F.3d 734 (4th Cir. 
1993). 
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where goods are carried pursuant to charter parties, the controlling law is 
invariably general maritime law. Contracts of affreightment often utilize 
standardized forms containing standard language. Some forms are used world-
wide or in particular trades, and the terms incorporated therein have developed 
meanings that are familiar to owners, charterers, brokers and others in the 
particular industry, as well as the courts. 
The same may be said of other charter party agreements, demise and time 
charters, which are not contracts of affreightment. The meaning of standard 
terms in charter parties has become an important part of the general maritime 
law. Chartering vessels is an international business generally conducted by 
brokers located at various exchanges and often involves owners and charterers 
of different nationalities. Even where a charter party involves only local 
interests, i.e., the owner and charterer are both local, such as is common in the 
charter of a barge to be used in river trade or in offshore activities in the Gulf 
of Mexico, the parties may still rely on standard form contracts embracing 
standard terms. The law applied in maritime commercial disputes, such as 
those involving bills of lading and charter parties, may be characterized as 
“transnational,” because the industry operates in a transnational mode. 
There are other statutes that deal with commercial law. The Ship Mortgage 
Act19 and the maritime liens provisions of that Act20 are two examples. The 
Ship Mortgage Act is quite comprehensive but the liens provisions are not. The 
latter deals only with liens for “necessaries” and not with tort or other liens. A 
considerable amount of maritime lien law, therefore, is contained in the general 
maritime law that has evolved over many years. 
The general maritime law governs other maritime contracts.  Since this 
area is not composed of a set of comprehensive rules, it is not unusual for 
courts to look to state law in the absence of federal precedent.21 Some contracts 
which appear to have a maritime flavor are nonetheless subject exclusively to 
state law. Thus, anomalies exist, the preeminent examples being that contracts 
to build vessels, mortgages to finance the building of vessels, and contracts for 
the sale of vessels have been held to be non-maritime contracts and are subject 
to state law, whereas contracts to repair vessels and to charter vessels are 
maritime contracts.22 
 
 19.  Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301-43 (1994). 
 20.  46 U.S.C. § 31341. (1994). 
 21. See, e.g., Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966) 
(citing the Uniform Commercial Code). 
 22.  See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 22-28 
(2d ed. 1975). 
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PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH 
In the personal injury area, there is a similar pattern. Congress has enacted 
the Jones Act,23 the Death on the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”),24 the Longshore 
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”),25 and the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act,26 all of which create remedies available to 
persons engaged in various aspects of maritime employment who are injured or 
killed. The personal injury provisions in the Jones Act and section 905(b) of 
the LHWCA typically create a right of action for negligence. These statutes, 
however, neither define “negligence” nor enumerate the damages that can be 
recovered. The Jones Act, by incorporation of FELA,27 does prescribe the 
consequences of contributory negligence and assumption of risk; § 905(b) of 
the LHWCA does not, nor does DOHSA. There are no statutory provisions 
dealing with apportionment of fault in the context of joint tortfeasors, 
indemnity, or contribution. 
There is no substantive legislation that deals with injury or death of 
passengers, save the provisions of DOHSA, which apply to all deaths on the 
high seas. Otherwise, cases involving passengers are resolved according to the 
general maritime law. There is no statute that applies to actions maintained by 
the survivors of persons killed in state territorial waters, except under the Jones 
Act and to a lesser extent under § 905(b) of the LHWCA.28 Existing law was 
developed in the Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc.29 decision and later 
expanded in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet30 and Miles v. Apex Marine.31 
Initially, courts accorded to seamen the right to maintenance and cure.32 
Likewise, federal admiralty courts have created the seaman’s right under the 
general maritime law to an action for unseaworthiness, extending the remedy 
to Sieracki seamen33 not covered by the LHWCA. The entire body of maritime 
products liability law is judge-made.34 All of the rules relating to maritime 
contribution and indemnity are contained in the general maritime law. 
 
 23.  Jones Act, ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1185 (1915) (current version at 46 U.S.C. app.  § 688 
(1994)). 
 24.  Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Act, ch. 111, 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (current version 
at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-67 (1994)). 
 25.  Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-48 (1994 & 
Supp. III 1997). 
 26.  Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1331-34 (1940) (repealed 1980). 
 27.  Federal Employer’s Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994). 
 28.  But see Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996). 
 29.  398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
 30.  414 U.S. 573 (1974). 
 31.  498 U.S. 19 (1990). 
 32.  See, e.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). 
 33.  Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1946). 
 34.  See, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 859  
(1986). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1374 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:1367 
While the position of state law in the maritime tort area may not be as 
significant as in the realm of contract law, it is not necessarily irrelevant. In 
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun,35 the Supreme Court held that survivors of a 
nonseafarer killed in state territorial waters may invoke state wrongful death 
remedies.36  There have also been exceptional cases in which state law has 
been used to supplement the general maritime law by providing additional state 
remedies in personal injury cases.37 Finally, state law has been influential in 
the development of the general maritime law, most recently in the newly 
developing tort area of maritime products liability. 
COLLISION 
The United States has ratified the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (“COLREGS”),38 the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 
(“SOLAS Convention”),39 including the recent International Safety 
Management Code, as well as a number of other conventions designed to 
promote safety at sea. But the United States has not ratified the Collision 
Convention,40 which deals with damages in collision cases, nor has it enacted 
comparable legislation. The entire law of collision, including the basis of 
liability, defenses, damages, proof of fault, presumptions and causation, is a 
product of the general maritime law, regardless of whether the collision occurs 
on the high seas, state territorial waters, or on inland waters.41 
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
The unique maritime right to limitation of liability has been established 
and implemented by statute,42 and embellished by the Supplemental Rules of 
Civil Procedure.43 Nonetheless, much of the law of limitation is judge-made 
law.44 
 
 35.  516 U.S. 199. 
 36. Id. at 207. 
 37.  Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 593 So. 2d 634 (La. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
819 (1992). Cf. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986) (stating that courts 
cannot supplement DOHSA); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (holding that no 
state worker’s compensation  exists for longshoremen). 
 38.  International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1601-08 
(1994). 
 39.  Safety of Life at Sea Convention, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.R.S. No. 9700 (1974). 
 40.  International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with respect to 
Collision Between Vessels, U.N. Regulation No. 134(a) (Brussels, September 23, 1910). 
 41.  See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at ch. 7; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch. 12. 
 42.  See Limitation of Liability Act, ch. 43, §4, 9 Stat. 635 (1851) (current version at 46 
U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  Sections 190-96 are also familiarly known as 
the Harter Act.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 43.  Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule F, 28 U.S.C. (1994). 
 44.  See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at ch. 10; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch. 3. 
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GENERAL AVERAGE 
In contrast, the law of general average, although based in contract, is 
viewed as part of the general maritime law. It is considered to be international 
in scope, much the same as the law of charter parties.45 
TOWAGE 
The law of towage is derived from the general maritime law.46 
PILOTAGE 
The law of pilotage is a blend of both federal and state regulatory law.  The 
rules of liability, however, are found in the general maritime law.47 
SALVAGE 
Salvage law,48 that is, the rules applicable in pure salvage situations, 
originally consisted of rules of the general maritime law. Subsequently, the 
United States became a party to an international salvage convention.49  The 
rules of contract salvage are contained in the general maritime law. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
In the environmental area,50 there is substantial legislation not only on the 
regulatory aspect, but also as to liability. The United States is a party to 
numerous conventions that deal with the prevention of pollution. With regard 
to oil pollution, however, Congress has expressly declined to preempt state 
law.51 
MARINE INSURANCE 
As to marine insurance, there is no statutory scheme comparable to the 
British Marine Insurance Act.52 After the decision in Wilburn Boat Co. v. 
 
 45.  See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at ch. 5; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch. 15. 
 46.  See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at 515-20; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch. 
10. 
 47.  See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at 520-22; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch. 
11. 
 48.  See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at ch. 8; SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch. 14. 
 49.  The United States became a party to the International Convention on Salvage of 1910. 
This was superceded by the International Convention on Salvage of 1989. See Cong. Rec. 
S15398, Oct. 29, 1991.  See also the Salvage Act, ch. 268, 31, 37 Stat. 242 (1912). 
 50.  See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 1, at ch. 16. 
 51.  See Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61 (1994 and Supp. III 1997); see generally, 
Robert Force, Limitation of Liability in Oil Pollution Cases: In Search of Concursus or 
Procedural Alternatives to Concursus, 22 TUL. MAR. L.J. 331 (1998). 
 52.  Marine Insurance Act 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 41 (Eng.). 
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Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co.,53 the law of marine insurance is a mixture of 
the general maritime law and state law.54 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Finally, there is a considerable body of congressional legislation and 
federal administrative regulation dealing with a variety of matters including the 
specification of the duties and the delegation of regulatory authority to the 
Coast Guard, registration of vessels, customs rules, licensing and protection of 
seamen, etc. 
This laborious exercise was not undertaken gratuitously but rather to 
illustrate that the law presently applied to what may be characterized as 
maritime activities in a broad sense represents a fairly elaborate scheme in 
which federal statutes, the general maritime law, and state law provide the 
substantive rules.  Both federal and state courts play a significant role in 
applying those rules and sometimes in formulating the rules. The present 
situation is not a blueprint with a perfectly symmetrical or rational delineation 
of rule-creating authority, but rather a borderless jigsaw puzzle with 
overlapping areas of authority. The complexity of the law, however, does not 
mean that maritime law is not a “single body” of law, or, despite prevailing 
distinctions, that maritime law is not relatively uniform. 
In reviewing the role of the general maritime law, one encounters similar 
complexity. Contemporary Supreme Court decisions illustrate the point. At one 
extreme, in East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,55 the Court 
quite simply, and without fanfare, created a new maritime tort of products 
liability, as to which, federal law, rather than state law, will presumably be 
applied. At the other extreme, the Yamaha56 court allowed the plaintiffs to 
invoke state wrongful death remedies in a case where the decedent was killed 
in state territorial waters. Likewise, in Miller v. American Dredging Co.,57 the 
Court upheld the application of Louisiana’s forum non conveniens statute to a 
case within admiralty jurisdiction. Using yet a different approach, the Court in 
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,58 expanded the judicially-created Moragne59 
wrongful death remedy to include the beneficiaries of seamen killed in 
territorial waters as result of unseaworthy conditions. In deference to the Jones 
Act and in the interest of uniformity, the Court refused to allow recovery for 
loss of consortium. In its most recent decision, Dooley Korean Airlines Co., 
 
 53.  348 U.S. 310, 321 (1955) (holding that in the absence of an established maritime rule, 
state law should be applied). 
 54.  See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at ch. 2. 
 55.  476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986). 
 56.  516 U.S. at 199. 
 57.  510 U.S. 443 (1992). 
 58.  498 U.S. 19 (1990). 
 59.  398 U.S. 375, 389 (1970). 
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Ltd.,60 the Court refused to exercise its power to create general maritime law 
by declining to follow several courts of appeals in recognizing a “survival” 
action as a complement to the Death on the High Seas Act.61 It concluded that 
if Congress had wanted to provide a survival counterpart to DOHSA, it would 
have done so. Therefore, it is difficult make sweeping statements about the 
current Court’s views on the general maritime law. Nevertheless, in areas 
where Congress has legislated, the present Court seems less willing to act as a 
creator of general maritime law. It is also safe to say, based on the Court’s 
decisions in Miller62 and Yamaha,63 that not all judicially-created general 
maritime rules, whether substantive or procedural, necessarily preempt state 
laws.64 Beyond these statements, one cannot divine much more from the 
Court’s recent opinions. That the Supreme Court appears to act inconsistently  
reveals the difficulty and complexity of the current debate and helps explain 
why issues involving the creation of general maritime law by the Court and the 
resultant preemption of state law have been continuously debated within the 
Court itself. 
As to the matter at hand, the case against the general maritime law is 
premised on two considerations: lack of constitutional authority and 
federalism. A broad interpretation of the scope of United States admiralty 
jurisdiction, no doubt, has an impact on federalism. Not only does admiralty 
jurisdiction open the federal courts to litigants who otherwise would be 
relegated to state courts, but usually, although not invariably, it also implicates 
the application of substantive federal admiralty law.65 
When Congress enacts maritime legislation under the Commerce Clause or 
some other express power, there is no question that conflicting state law must 
yield to the Supremacy Clause. The same result ensues when courts put a 
judicial “gloss” on congressional legislation, or fill gaps in federal legislation. 
In the absence of legislative action, what is the status of the general maritime 
law? The question is, in reality, two questions: (1) do federal courts have 
constitutional authority to create substantive rules of maritime law?, and (2) if 
so, should those substantive rules preempt inconsistent state law? I maintain 
that the answer to the first question should be a resounding “Yes”; the answer 
to the second should be “It depends.” 
I start with the premise that not every controversy regarding “federal 
common law” is susceptible of resolution by way of a single theory or formula. 
 
 60.  118 S. Ct. 1890, 1895 (1998). 
 61.  See, e.g., Azzopardi v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 742 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 62.  506 U.S. 809 (1992). 
 63.  516 U.S. 199 (1996). 
 64.  Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 545 (1995) (citing East 
River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 864 (1986)). But see Yamaha, 516 U.S. 
at 210 n.8, 216 n.14. 
 65.  See Grubert, 513 U.S. at 545 (citing East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 864). 
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The language and the history of particular provisions in the Constitution are 
important in trying to discover their meaning. It is submitted, however, that 
practical realities of particular circumstances should be given some weight. 
The latter statement is all the more cogent when the text of the Constitution, its 
“legislative history,” and the objectives of the framers are unclear. Of course, 
the mere fact that the present system has evolved does not mean that it is the 
best system. A congressionally enacted, comprehensive maritime code may 
well provide a better approach as some countries have concluded. But that is 
not likely to occur. Moreover, merely because the system has evolved does not 
presuppose that it is “constitutional” in the context of Erie v. Tompkins.66 On 
the other hand, simply because Erie is now regarded as the correct approach in 
diversity cases, does not necessarily signify that it should be the controlling 
approach in admiralty cases, despite the ease with which the logic of Erie 
might be applied to admiralty cases. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the general maritime law has been 
characterized as part of the federal common law, it is submitted that maritime 
law, especially in light of the unprecedented grant of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction in Article III, is sufficiently unique so as to merit individual 
analysis in determining whether it is a valid creature of federal judicial power. 
What then is so special about the general maritime law? There are several 
responses to this question. 
1. The general maritime law is an invaluable legacy from the past. It 
reflects an evolution from the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in 
Article III of the Constitution to the present. The development of the general 
maritime law as we know it should not be undermined by arguments that may 
be intellectually appealing but that nevertheless completely ignore the law’s 
historical development. The arguments for restricting the scope of the general 
maritime law have been considered and rejected for nearly two centuries. 
During that period, many Supreme Court justices have played a role in the 
development of the general maritime law up to its present form. We should be 
loathe to discount their collective experience and contributions. The Court that 
decided Erie never extended its rationale, or its holding, to the general 
maritime law. In fact, a subsequent Supreme Court decision expressly refused 
to apply Erie to the general maritime law.67 
2. It has been demonstrated that the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 
conferred by the Constitution was intended and understood by the framers to 
extend not only to matters involving relations with other countries and their 
citizens, that is, those aspects of maritime law which are incidents of 
sovereignty or which derive from international law, but that it also included 
 
 66.  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 67.  See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 411 (1953). 
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ordinary private law cases, such as seamen’s wage claims.68 In the era 
immediately following ratification of the Constitution, lawyers regarded 
federal court as the appropriate venue in which to initiate admiralty and 
maritime actions, including private law claims.69 
3. Early cases indicate that private maritime law in the United States was 
contemplated to be judge-made law, and that it was treated as a single, uniform 
body of law regardless of whether cases were heard in federal or state court.70 
Although the expanding scope of admiralty jurisdiction and the growing 
complexity of maritime law have brought increasingly more “local” matters 
before federal courts, this does not undermine the benefits, such as uniformity, 
of a single system as compared to the pre-Erie dual system which existed in 
diversity cases. 
The very existence and the language of the “saving to suitors” clause71 
supports this conclusion. The statute applies where there is jurisdictional 
overlap between actions that could be brought as admiralty actions and those 
that could be brought at law. The clause creates the option for plaintiffs to 
bring their actions as either admiralty actions in federal court or as actions at 
law either in a state court or in a federal court where diversity jurisdiction is 
present. What the statute “saves,” however, is the jurisdictional capacity to 
assert the claim in a common law action, which, effectuates the right to have a 
jury adjudicate the dispute. The clause does not purport to contemplate the 
application of different substantive rules depending on whether the action is 
brought at law or in admiralty. Courts that have entertained cases pursuant to 
the saving to suitors clause have applied the substantive rules of the general 
maritime law, except in those limited instances where it has been deemed 
 
 68.  See generally, Jonathan M. Gutoff, Original Understandings and the Private Law 
Origins of the Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Reply to Professor Casto Federal Common Law 
of Admiralty, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 316 (1999); William R. Casto, The Origin of Federal 
Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 117 
(1993).  Casto asserts that the primary motive for enacting the admiralty jurisdiction clause was to 
confer federal jurisdiction of public law matters, but also concludes: 
The most that can be said is that the drafters and the ratifiers of the Constitution’s 
admiralty clause knew that the clause’s general language encompassed private disputes 
but gave little thought to the matter. This combination of knowledge and indifference 
could be viewed as license for future generations to shape admiralty jurisdiction according 
to future values and needs. 
  Id. at 156. 
 69.  See Gutoff, supra note 68, at 383-87. 
 70.  See David W. Robertson, 184 ADMIRALTY & FEDERALISM (1970); Jonathan M. Gutoff, 
Federal Common Law and Congressional Delegation: A Reconceptualization of Admiralty, to be 
published in 61 U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000). 
 71.  28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1994): 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: 
(1)any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all 
other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled. 
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appropriate for state law to supplement or fill gaps in the general maritime 
law.72 
4. The grant of admiralty jurisdiction in Article III is sui generis. With the 
exception of “federal question” jurisdiction and jurisdiction over certain land 
disputes, all other bases for jurisdiction enumerated in Article III are premised 
on the status of the litigants, rather than the substance of the dispute. Unlike 
federal question jurisdiction, the scope of which is at least superficially 
ascertainable from the text of the Constitution itself or the relevant treaty or 
statute, there is no similar source for determining the substantive rule of law to 
be applied in admiralty and maritime cases. Surely it was contemplated that 
federal judges, in the absence of legislation, would find appropriate sources 
and rules to apply in admiralty cases, just as their English and state 
counterparts had done before them.73 
5. Making admiralty law “federal law” promotes uniformity of the law. 
Although many areas of law might benefit from uniformity, it is particularly 
important in the maritime arena. First, there is an intimate relationship between 
maritime transportation and interstate and foreign commerce. Second, 
maritime law is often applied in situations involving relations between foreign 
nations and their citizens and the United States and its citizens. Third, the goal 
of uniformity in maritime matters is an international objective. This 
differentiates maritime law from other areas of the federal common law. From 
the earliest of times, judges recognized that maritime law had an international 
dimension and that some rules were, in modern parlance, “transnational.” The 
Comité Maritime Internationale and the various national maritime law 
associations throughout the world, including the Maritime Law Association of 
the United States, have been committed to achieving international uniformity 
in many areas of private maritime law. Today, the body of maritime law 
includes many international conventions; some have been subscribed to by the 
United States, including measures addressing private law. 
6. Necessity requires the manifestation of a general maritime law. What 
rules would apply to matters outside the jurisdiction of any state? Although 
numerous statutes provide rules of maritime law, there are gaps in existing 
legislation, and important areas where there is no legislation at all. 
If the Supreme Court applied the Erie rationale to the general maritime law 
tomorrow, assuredly there would be chaos. By and large, there is a single or 
unitary system of maritime law in the United States, although it is fraught with 
complexities. The system is based primarily on federal statutory and general 
maritime law and only to a limited extent on state law. If general maritime law 
were to disappear overnight, there would be nothing to effectively replace it. 
There is no state law regarding collision, charter parties, maritime liens, 
 
 72.  See generally, Gutoff, supra note 70 and sources cited therein. 
 73.  See Gutoff, supra note 68, at 378-80. 
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general average, etc. Whose law would apply on the high seas? The evolution 
of this system warrants a presumption of validity. 
By contrast, the result in Erie was easy to assimilate. After Erie, in 
diversity cases, where federal jurisdiction is based solely on the citizenship of 
the parties, federal judges decide ordinary contract and tort cases according to 
the state rules that would have been applied had they been brought in state 
courts originally. Underlying the Erie decision is the notion that the 
formulation of substantive rules to be applied in diversity cases was a matter 
reserved to the states. Except to the extent that Congress legitimately entered a 
constitutionally designated federal area through the exercise of an 
appropriately delegated legislative power, federal courts had no authority to 
disregard state law or, let alone, to create federal law. The Rules of Decision 
Act74 added authority to this conclusion. Erie created no chaos because the 
existing state rules were presently available for application by federal judges in 
diversity cases. State law filled the breach created by the extinction of the 
preexisting federal common law. The same kinds of cases that were tried in 
federal courts under diversity jurisdiction were also tried in state courts. That 
the parties to a lawsuit are diverse and may opt for a federal court are merely 
fortuitous factors. Prior to Erie, the results reached by state courts in suits 
between diverse parties were the same as those reached in identical disputes 
between non-diverse parties. After Erie, federal courts were charged with 
reaching the same result that would have been reached if the suit had been 
heard in state court. 
The constitutional dimension of Erie should also be understood in the 
context of the text of the Rules of Decision Act. In so doing, under the original 
wording of the Act, there should remain no tension between Erie and the 
general maritime law. The original Act obligated federal courts to apply state 
law in “trials at common law.”75 An admiralty action brought in federal court 
under Title 28, § 1333 of the United States Code was not regarded as an action 
at common law. Thus, it was not subject to either the language or spirit of the 
Act.76 
7. The framers of the Constitution included diversity cases within the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts because of their interest in the status of the 
parties, not because of an interest in the substance of their disputes. The 
framers of the Constitution included admiralty and maritime cases within the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts precisely because of their subject matter. At 
the very least, it is unquestionable that Article III of the Constitution grants 
jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases to the federal judiciary. But, 
does it make sense to limit the admiralty clause to nothing more than a key into 
 
 74.  Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 92. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  See Gutoff, supra note 68, at 27-30, 52-53. 
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federal court? Consider that Article III also includes diversity jurisdiction, 
which embraces suits between citizens of different states and between aliens 
and United States citizens. Subject to congressional implementation, a federal 
forum would be available under diversity jurisdiction to many cases that might 
otherwise qualify as being within admiralty jurisdiction. It is unlikely that the 
admiralty provision was inserted simply to open the federal courts to private 
maritime disputes between citizens of the same state. Likewise, Article III 
includes federal question jurisdiction, which encompasses claims arising under 
federal statutes. Subject to congressional implementation, public law admiralty 
cases such as prize and revenue cases, and cases involving crimes on the high 
seas, could have been entertained in federal court, as they were likely to arise 
under federal law.77 It is once again submitted that the admiralty jurisdiction 
provision was intended to confer more than mere access to the federal courts. 
8. Critics of the general maritime law should take into account the various 
ways in which “maritime law,” in its broad sense, accommodates the interests 
of federalism. As heretofore articulated, limits on admiralty jurisdiction in the 
contractual realm leave certain matters to state law, such as contracts to 
construct ships and contracts for the sale of ships.  State law also applies to 
certain preliminary contracts deemed to be non-maritime.78  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court itself has acknowledged in several recent cases that, 
notwithstanding the presence of admiralty jurisdiction, federal law does not 
always preempt state law. For example, in Yamaha, the Court stated: 
The federal cast of admiralty law, we have observed, means that “state law 
must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this Court 
finds inroads on a harmonious system[,] [b]ut this limitation still leaves the 
States a wide scope.” Our precedent does not precisely delineate that scope. As 
we recently acknowledged, “[i]t would be idle to pretend that the line 
separating permissible from impermissible state regulation is readily 
discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence.” We attempt no grand synthesis or 
reconciliation of our precedent today, but confine our inquiry to the modest 
question whether it was Moragne’s design to terminate recourse to state 
remedies when nonseafarers meet death in territorial waters. 79 
 
 77.  Although the general federal question jurisdiction provision now contained in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 was not part of the original Judiciary Act, Congress supplied specific jurisdictional grants 
applicable to piracy, customs matters, etc. For example, the first Judiciary Act conferred 
jurisdiction in the district courts over crimes and offenses within the respective districts and on 
the high seas. 1 Stat. § 9, Chapter 8 of that legislation made piracy a crime. The first Judiciary 
Act also conferred jurisdiction in the district courts over all suits for penalties and forfeitures 
under the laws of the United States. Chapter 35 of that legislation set up an elaborate system of 
customs regulations providing various forfeitures and penalties for violations thereof. 
 78.  See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 22, at 26-28. 
 79.  Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 210 n.8 (internal citations omitted). 
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The Court later states: 
The Third Circuit left for initial consideration by the District Court the 
question whether Pennsylvania’s wrongful-death remedies or Puerto Rico’s 
applied. The Court of Appeals also left open, as do we, the source—federal or 
state—of the standards governing liability, as distinguished from the rules on 
remedies. We thus reserve for another day reconciliation of the maritime 
personal injury decisions that rejected state substantive liability standards, and 
the maritime wrongful-death cases in which state law has held sway.80 
Subsequently, in Grubart, the Court explained the complexity of 
substantive maritime law: 
[E]xercise of federal admiralty jurisdiction does not result in automatic 
displacement of state law. It is true that, “[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes 
the application of substantive admiralty law.” But, to characterize that law, as 
the city apparently does, as “federal rules of decision,” is “a destructive 
oversimplification of the highly intricate interplay of the States and the 
National Government in their regulation of maritime commerce. It is true that 
state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this 
Court finds inroads on a harmonious system. But this limitation still leaves the 
States a wide scope.” (“Drawn from state and federal sources, the general 
maritime law is an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of 
those rules, and newly created rules.”) Thus, the city’s proposal to synchronize 
the jurisdictional enquiry with the test for determining the applicable 
substantive law would discard a fundamental feature of admiralty law, that 
federal admiralty courts sometimes do apply state law.81 
On occasion, state tort remedies have been used to supplement maritime 
law, notably in the wrongful death area.82 
In implementing the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred by 
Article III, Congress has reserved an important role for state courts through the 
“saving to suitors” clause. As interpreted, this provision enables state courts to 
hear the vast majority of cases that otherwise could be brought in federal court 
under admiralty jurisdiction. With limited exceptions, the savings to suitors 
proviso permits a plaintiff to opt for a state forum. Dictum in Romero v. 
International Terminal Operating Co.83 has had the effect of limiting removal 
of “admiralty” cases from state court, reinforcing the role of state courts in 
removal cases. Furthermore, there are exceptions to the general rule that cases 
brought in state court under saving to suitors are nevertheless governed by 
 
 80.  Id. at 216 n.14 (internal citations omitted). 
 81.  Grubart, 513 U.S. at 545-46 (internal citations omitted). 
 82.  See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 215-16; Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc., 593 So. 2d at 637 
(construing U.S. CONST. art. III §2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1333).  See generally id. (supplementing 
admiralty law by applying a state strict liability remedy in maritime personal injury case). 
 83.  358 U.S. 354, 363 (1959). 
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substantive maritime law,84 and it is customary for state courts to apply state 
law in “savings” cases when it is consistent with federal admiralty law.85 
The opportunity available to state courts to play a role in the development 
of the general maritime law when adjudicating admiralty cases should not be 
overlooked. For example, if a plaintiff exercises his or her right under saving to 
suitors, then a state court, although bound by federal admiralty law, may be 
forced to create an applicable rule of law in the absence of controlling 
authority.  Federal courts hold no monopoly in the business of creating general 
maritime law, and state courts are bound only by the admiralty decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court.86 This structure reflects the status of substantive 
admiralty law at the time the Constitution was adopted. Federal and state 
courts have developed a common body of rules. Although there are situations 
where lower federal courts create rules of general maritime law, federal 
preemption does not occur unless and until the United States Supreme Court so 
declares. There is nothing to suggest that the Constitution or the framers 
contemplated multiple systems or rules of admiralty law. For the reasons set 
forth, I maintain that the general maritime law is constitutional and is an 
appropriate subject of federal common law. 
In light of the constitutional and federalism implications in the creation and 
application of the general maritime law, it is not surprising that some of the 
most controversial admiralty cases have dealt with the scope of admiralty 
jurisdiction and its corresponding effect, preemption of state law. As to the 
preemption issue, the interests of federalism demand a more flexible and 
principled approach. The Supreme Court has failed to develop well-calibrated 
rules delimiting admiralty and maritime jurisdiction that sufficiently balance 
national and local interests. In the same vein, the Court has failed to develop 
conflicts of laws rules, which are particularly essential in cases which fall only 
marginally within federal admiralty jurisdiction. This criticism is best 
illustrated by the infamous, much maligned Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen 
case.87 In Jensen, the Court held that the family of a longshoreman who was 
killed on a vessel in state waters could not recover benefits under a state 
workers’ compensation scheme. If Congress had enacted legislation 
prohibiting state workers’ compensation benefits for maritime workers, or, if 
Congress had provided its own remedy for maritime workers, there would have 
been a direct conflict between federal and state law, especially if the 
congressional remedy was more generous. Under these circumstances, the 
 
 84.  Green, 593 So. 2d 634, 637 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 819 (1992). 
 85. Id.  
 86. Green, 593 So. 2d at 638 (citing Daigle v. Coastal Marine, Inc., 488 So. 2d 679, 681 
(1986)). 
 87.  244 U.S. 205 (1917).  The holding in Jensen has been superceded by statute.  See 
Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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Court’s decision would have been correct. Even in the absence of 
congressional legislation, if the Supreme Court had created special remedies 
for injured maritime workers that were not available under state law, there 
would have been a conflict. If the judicially created remedy was more 
generous, then such a conflict might have justified the result.  But in the Jensen 
situation, the state law filled a gap in maritime law by providing a remedy 
where none existed, either in the federal statute or in the general maritime law. 
Thus, the majority of the Court used the absence of a statutory or general 
maritime law remedy (a negative law, if there is such a thing) to preempt the 
state law.88 
Several factors undermine the Court’s decision. First, the majority opinion 
does not sufficiently value the significance of the state’s interest in enacting its 
workers’ compensation statute. The statute was general legislation, covering 
thousands of workers in the state. This legislation did not single out or 
discriminate against the maritime industry. It was a state’s attempt to protect its 
labor force and their families. The majority opinion undervalues the significant 
state interest in being able to pass on to employers the costs of personal injury 
and death generated by their industries. The majority opinion overlooks the 
financial impact on the state, which otherwise must bear the financial burden 
of providing for disabled employees and their families in case of work related 
injuries and death. 
Second, the opinion ignores the relationship between the state and the 
decedent longshoreman. The “covered” longshore workers were local residents 
of the state. They lived and worked within the state. In contrast to seamen, they 
were essentially a non-mobile work force. 
Third, the majority opinion glosses over the land-based dimension of 
longshore work. Not only do longshoremen live on the land, they also perform 
a substantial amount of their work on the land. They are engaged in a type of 
maritime employment where national interests and local interests converge. In 
such situations, local interests should be accorded more weight in resolving the 
preemption issue. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, if the decedent 
had been killed moments after having left the ship, maritime law would not 
have applied at all. His family would have had no remedy under maritime law. 
Even though he was engaged in maritime employment, they could not have 
satisfied the maritime locus test required to establish maritime tort jurisdiction. 
Moreover, unlike seamen, who have long been the beneficiaries of 
protective congressional legislation and who have been deemed to be wards of 
the court, longshoremen and other land-based maritime workers, including ship 
builders and repairers, had to look to the states for protection. The state’s goal 
in Jensen, compensation of injured land-based maritime workers, also 
implicates national concerns. Either Congress, or perhaps even the courts, 
 
 88. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 217. 
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could have created adequate remedies for workers injured or killed on the job; 
they did not. Yet, there was also a sufficiently important and strong state 
interest that justified state intervention in the absence of conflicting federal 
remedies. It is precisely in such situations that accommodation is required. If 
Congress later decided to enact comprehensive legislation that was national in 
scope, that would have been the time to consider preemption. 
The Jensen majority concluded that state law could not be applied to a case 
otherwise subject to maritime jurisdiction if the state law either “contravenes 
the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material 
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes 
with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and 
interstate relations.”89 It opined that Congress could enact such a law, which 
would apply uniformly throughout the country. But in fact, there was no 
contrary act of Congress. Still, the Court construed the absence of 
congressional legislation with the same force it would give to legislation that 
conflicted with state law. The state law was invalid not because it conflicted 
with an act of Congress, but because there was no act of Congress. In other 
words, it violated negative legislation, that is, it violated no law. 
The majority opinion does not otherwise indicate in what respect the 
exemption of employers from liability to injured workers was a characteristic 
feature of the general maritime law. To the contrary, injured seamen could 
recover “workers’ compensation” benefits from their employers in the form of 
the judicially created remedy of maintenance and cure.90 Like maintenance and 
cure, workers’ compensation is not based on employer fault, so the imposition 
of liability without fault was not in itself antithetical to the characteristics of 
the general maritime law. 
Instead of looking at the importance of the local interest, it focused on the 
importance of uniformity, i.e., uniformly imposing on longshoremen the risks 
of their employment. The Court simply omitted consideration of the local 
interest and punted the problem to Congress. Instead of reasoning that the lack 
of congressional action may have been prompted by an intent to leave matters 
to the states, that is, deferring to congressional wisdom that a state workers’ 
compensation scheme which included shore-based workers was preferable to a 
federal compensation remedy or to no remedy at all, the Jensen majority 
essentially ignored Congress. In fact, we know from hindsight that the Court 
ultimately compelled Congress to enact legislation providing maritime workers 
with a compensation remedy that indisputably Congress believed should have 
 
 89.  Id. at 216. 
 90.  See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (reiterating seaman’s right to maintenance and 
cure). 
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been provided by state law and subject to state control.91 A bad decision by the 
Court in a case such as Jensen, however, should not undermine the concept of 
“the general maritime law” and the important role that it plays. When 
discussing Jensen, it is important to consider that no subsequent decision since 
Jensen and its progeny has taken such an extreme view on preemption. As a 
matter of fact, in another controversial decision that has been subject to much 
criticism by admiralty lawyers, Wilburn Boat, the Supreme Court refused to 
preempt state law.92 
In the author’s opinion, a distinction should be made between state law that 
purports to negate or diminish rights under federal maritime law and state law 
that fills in gaps or supplements federal maritime law. The state workers’ 
compensation scheme accomplished both. Such legislation should not be 
preempted in the absence of an overwhelming need for uniformity, which is 
difficult to conceive of in the area of personal injury or death. Even where 
Congress has acted, supplemental or complementary state law is not invariably 
preempted. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the LHWCA does 
not preempt state worker’s compensation laws in situations where maritime 
workers covered by the federal statute are injured on land.93 Should a state 
statute, however, purport to diminish remedies created under the general 
maritime law, preemption would be appropriate. 
A major problem with Jensen is that the criteria articulated in the opinion 
are simply not useful. In Miller v. American Dredging,94 for example, the 
majority pays lip service to the Jensen test, but ultimately finds the 
substantive-procedural dichotomy more helpful. In other words, it was easier 
for the Court to uphold the Louisiana forum non conveniens statute by 
classifying it as procedural, holding that procedural rules were not outcome-
determinative. The same substantive law would apply regardless of the forum 
in which the case was adjudicated. 
In a step in the right direction, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
has tried to refine the Jensen test into more workable criteria.95 As stated by the 
court: 
(1) “state law is not preempted when it contains a detailed scheme to fill a 
gap in maritime law”96; 
(2) “state law is not preempted when the law regulates behavior in which 
the state has an especially strong interest”97; 
 
 91.  Compare Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715 (1980) with Knickerbocker Ice 
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). 
 92.  348 U.S. 310 (1955), reh’g denied, 249 U.S. 907 (1955). 
 93.  Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 723-24. 
 94.  506 U.S. 809 (1992). 
 95.  Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1987), rev’d. 486 U.S. 
140 (1988). 
 96. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d at 317. 
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(3) “maritime law preempts [state law] whenever a uniform rule will 
facilitate maritime commerce, or, conversely, when non-uniform regulation 
will work a material disadvantage to commercial actors”98; 
(4) “maritime law preempts state law when the state law impinges upon 
international or interstate relations”99; 
(5) the final factor, which the court admitted to be stated “badly” is “that 
plaintiff should win personal injury or death maritime tort claims.”100 
While far from perfect, this approach lends itself more towards balancing 
state interests with the interests that ultimately underlie the need for federal 
maritime law. 
The author believes that the critics of the general maritime law should  
both examine more closely the many ways in which maritime law 
accommodates federalism and restudy the post-Jensen decisions which are 
more sensitive to state law. It would probably be more fruitful to help fine-tune 
jurisdictional criteria and the rules for resolving conflicts between federal and 
state law. For example, is it really necessary to exercise jurisdiction over and 
apply federal law in incidents involving pleasure boats in waters that are used 
solely for recreational purposes merely because such waters might sustain 
commerce? Should not the Supreme Court develop more workable choice of 
law rules in deciding whether admiralty courts should apply state law where 
state interests are important and there is no corresponding benefit to national 
interests? This is where I believe the focus should be and I am not alone.101 
 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 318. 
 100. Id. 
 101.  See Michael F. Sturley, Was Preble Stolz Right?, 29 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 317, 331 
(1998). 
